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Abstract 
Discussions around the growing difference in wealth, as well as its distribution, has gained 
prominent attention recently. What are the possible causes that could potentially contribute to the 
difference in wealth and its distribution? In this paper, we propose a novel reason, i.e., famine. We 
combine contemporary individual-level wealth data with historical data on famine severity in 
China and show that exposure to famine has a negative effect on the wealth of individuals born 
during this period. We further pursue a number of strategies to determine whether the relation we 
uncover is, in fact, causal. 
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The distribution of income and wealth is a widely discussed and controversial topic (Piketty and 
Saez, 2014). In particular, discussions on the growing difference in wealth, as well as its 
distribution, has gained prominent attention recently, ranging from academic and popular media 
to the political spectrum. In response, a large body of literature has proposed various reasons that 
could potentially contribute to the difference in wealth as well as its distribution within as well as 
between countries. Popular reasons include r > g (interest rate is higher than the growth rate), 
institutional legacy (e.g. democracy, slavery, apartheid), tax policy (e.g. inheritance tax, estate tax), 
the geographical distribution of resources (e.g. oil), property rights, and caste system to name a 
few. However, existing studies mostly draw on simple correlations and unable to establish a causal 
mechanism underlying the relationship.1 Furthermore, there are still yet unexplored reasons that 
could lead to inequality in the longer run.  
In this paper, we provide a novel reason, i.e., famine. In particular, we use difference-in-
difference method and examine the effect of the Chinese population’s exposure to the Great 
Famine (1959–61) at different periods of their life on wealth inequality in present-day China. 
Furthermore, we pursue a number of strategies to determine whether the relation we uncover is, in 
fact, causal. 
Combining contemporary individual-level wealth data with historical data on famine 
severity by province, we question whether the exposure to the famine contributed to the 
development of wealth inequality within China. Our hypothesis builds on well-established insights 
from the medical and health literature suggesting that exposure to a fragile environment during a 
person’s early life can have persistent and profound impacts later (Barker, 1990; Almond and 
 
1 Recent literature such as Jakobsen et al. (2020) is an exception.   
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Currie, 2011). Using province-by-cohort level variation in exposure to the famine as a quasi-
experiment, we find that the famine accounted for a substantial decline in wealth for individuals 
born during this period. In fact, our estimation reveals that on average, a one percentage point 
increase in exposure to the famine led to a 1.4–2.0 percent decline in wealth. In terms of magnitude, 
the famine we examine caused an average decline in wealth of 29.6–52.0 percent for those 
individuals born during this period. 
During the period on which we focus, China also experienced additional events, including 
a sharp decline in the birth rate during the famine and a sharp increase in the birth rate immediately 
after the famine that may also affect the wealth distribution. We formally test whether these events 
affect our main findings. First, we run a placebo test to check the parallel trends before and after 
the famine and obtain no statistically significant results. Second, we test our findings through an 
alternate direct measure of famine severity to confirm whether any bias associated with the size of 
the survivor birth cohort drives our results. This is because this may reflect endogenous fertility 
decisions during this extreme period and would fail to capture the mortality rates of adults and the 
elderly. We consider the province-level excess mortality rate during this period as a direct major 
of famine severity and obtain results consistent with our main findings. 
This paper ccontributes to the existing literature (Deshpande, 2000; Alvaredo and Atkinson, 
2010; Alvaredo et al, 2013; Deere et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2018; Alvaredo et al., 
2018) by introducing a potential new driver of wealth inequality in the economy. We also 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the long-term legacy of economic inequalities arising from 
specific historical events. Earlier studies, including Deshpande (2000) and Alvaredo and Atkinson 
(2010), examine institutional policies or mechanisms that generally last for a very long period of 
time. For example, it is believed that South Africa and Brazil are among the most unequal countries 
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in the world due to the legacies of apartheid and slavery (Brazil was the last major country to 
abolish slavery in 1887), respectively. Similarly, inequality is arguably high in India owing to the 
historical presence of the caste system. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
effect of a short-term fragile environment on inequality in the longer run. In particular, our findings 
suggest that the consequences of fragile and extreme events (in our case, famine) may not only 
cause a deterioration in short-run economic and social outcomes, which is well known, but could 
also lead to substantial future economic inequality over the longer run. 
This is an interesting finding because inequality has risen rapidly in China recently. In 
evidence, Piketty et al. (2019) conclude that China’s levels of inequality were close to those of the 
Nordic countries in the late 1970s, but are now approaching those of the US. Notably, the biggest 
increase took place between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s. Our findings contribute to the literature 
exploring the potential mechanism for the rapid rise in inequality in China since the mid-1980s as 
the famine cohorts entered the labor market during the same period. Nonetheless, our focus on the 
historical determinants of wealth inequality should not imply that other factors are unimportant. A 
number of existing studies have shown the importance of determinants such as escalating housing 
prices, differential saving, capital accumulation, and changes in the legal system of property 
contributing to wealth inequality in China (e.g., Li and Wan, 2015; Knight et al., 2017; Piketty et 
al., 2019). As we demonstrate, a strong historical legacy on wealth inequality remains in China 
even today. 
This study also broadly relates to the literature that examines the effect of exposure to 
famine, including Neugebauer et al. (1999), Ravelli et al. (1999), Brown et al. (2000), Hulshoff 
Pol et al. (2000), Chen and Zhou (2007), Meng and Qian (2009), Neelsen and Stratmann (2011), 
and Dercon and Porter (2014). Together, these illustrate that exposure to famine in general and in 
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utero exposure to famine in particular have a significant effect on health and labor market 
outcomes in the long run. Furthermore, Almond et al. (2010) find the negative effect of in utero 
exposure to famine on adult economic status in terms of housing size. Our findings thus 
complement this literature by additionally suggesting that exposure to famine could create a 
substantial amount of wealth inequality within a society. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief background 
of the Great Chinese Famine. Section III describes the data used in the analysis. Section IV 
discusses our identification strategy. Section V presents the main results. Section VI presents the 
placebo test and other robustness checks of our analysis. Section VII concludes. 
II. The Great Chinese Famine (1959–61) 
Although there is some controversy over the exact timing of China’s Great Famine, economic 
research mostly agrees that it began in 1959 and ended in 1961. Furthermore, the extant literature 
on China’s Great Famine also debates the factors that primarily led to what ultimately became a 
nationwide calamity. One strand of research argues in favor of the food availability decline (FAD) 
hypothesis that most associate with the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the collectivization of 
agriculture that began in 1958 (Lin, 1990; Yao, 1999). The GLF and the collectivization of 
agriculture resulted in a drastic decline in grain production in 1959, and this continued for the next 
two years before coming to a halt in 1962. Another belief is that food wastage from communal 
dining during the GLF was also partly responsible for the famine (Chang and Wen, 1997). 
In contrast, an alternative strand of research focuses on those factors that led to entitlement 
failure. For example, it is believed that overzealous officials exaggerated grain production figures 
to make a good impression about the success of collectivization and exported rice to the urban 
population and that this intensified famine in rural areas (Lin and Yang, 2000; Meng et al., 2015). 
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Furthermore, recent findings by Kasahara and Li (2019) suggest some evidence that grain exports 
used to repay loans from the Soviet Union and the import of industrial equipment to promote the 
GLF further intensified the famine in China. 
Regardless of the causes, both the urban and rural populations in China experienced an 
increase in mortality rates during the famine years. However, the rural rate in 1960 was 2.6 times 
the pre-famine rate (Gørgens et al., 2011). Urban residents fared better, but were not spared, with 
death rates at their peak in 1960 being 80 percent above their pre-famine level (Almond et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the intensity of famine varied by province. For example, Anhui and Sichuan 
were among the worst affected provinces, whereas Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Beijing 
were among the least affected. Nevertheless, the famine caused an estimated 23–30 million excess 
deaths in China (Ashton et al., 1984; Peng 1987). From the perspective of the excess number of 
deaths, the Great Chinese Famine outstrips any other famine in recorded history. 
III. Data Sources and their Description 
The greatest concern when studying the effects of extreme events, such as famine, is the selection 
effect arising for those that survive. Several earlier studies have categorically pointed out the 
potential concerns of attenuation bias caused by the selection for survival (Friedman, 1982; 
Bozzoli et al., 2009; Gørgens et al., 2012). For example, when famine is severe and mortality rates 
are high, survivors are more likely to be comprised of selected individuals who have naturally 
stronger constitutions and are better able to resist the negative effects of famine (Meng and Qian, 
2009). Therefore, survivors are typically from the top of the distribution of important 
characteristics, such as physical resilience, income, and access to nourishment. 
Concomitantly, those from the lower parts of the distribution are more likely to die 
(Gørgens et al., 2012). However, most research that studies the effect of famine either concentrates 
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on the most vulnerable population, such as the rural population or non-migrants, or does not 
attempt to control for the selection effect arising from survivorship bias. Meng and Qian (2009) 
propose a novel solution to address the possible attenuation bias caused by the selection for 
survival by estimating the impact of famine on the upper quantiles of the distribution of outcomes. 
A further concern when studying wealth inequality is that detailed individual-level data on 
wealth are rarely available. Economic outcomes such as education, working hours, and income, 
and health data at the individual level are relatively easy to measure from general survey. However, 
it is quite difficult to measure wealth, especially at the individual level. This is particularly 
important for our estimation as we wish to examine the impact of exposure to famine at different 
periods of life on wealth outcomes. Therefore, it is difficult for us to use the common household 
wealth surveys (such as China Household Income Project (CHIP) and China Family Panel Survey 
(CFPS)) considered by earlier studies in China to examine the effect of famine on wealth inequality. 
We do our best to address these inherent challenges in this paper. We collect data on 
wealthy Chinese individuals in present-day China from the Hurun Report, which lists wealthy 
individuals in China and reports their current wealth every year.2 In addition to individual wealth, 
it also reports their place of birth and current age. Focusing on these individuals for our sample 
study has several merits. First, the individuals in our sample are from the upper quantiles of the 
distribution of wealth outcomes. Therefore, the attenuation bias caused by the selection for survival 
is minimal, as argued by Meng and Qian (2009). Second, unlike individuals in other countries who 
mostly inherit their family wealth, almost all the individuals we include in our sample are 
entrepreneurs self-made by establishing new firms. This is particularly useful as Communist Party 
 
2The Hurun Report is quite similar to the Forbes billionaires’ list that ranks billionaires globally on their current US dollar wealth 
holdings. In the Hurun Report, an individual is eligible for ranking if he or she holds a minimum of 2 billion Chinese yuan.  
http://www.hurun.net/EN/Home/ 
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rule in China restricted the formation of private enterprises until relatively recently. Therefore, 
most individuals in our sample are less likely to inherit family wealth, and their current wealth 
holdings are then a good predictor of their lifetime productivity. Third, these individuals are not 
only entrepreneurs, but also contribute as job creators and innovators, are current and future 
competitors both in China as well as on the world stage, and have a substantial impact on the 
Chinese economy. Therefore, our sample population is more likely to display similar attributes. 
However, focusing on these individuals for our sample also involves important limitations. 
Primarily, we are unable to provide the overall impact of famine on wealth inequality in present-
day China. The picture we obtain from our estimation is partial because the individuals we consider 
belong to only the upper quantiles of the wealth distribution and thus do not represent the overall 
Chinese population today. Our estimation can thus provide some insights into the degree of 
inequality within the top of the wealth distribution. We should keep this in mind when generalizing 
our findings. Similar problems could also arise if we estimate the level of inequality from tax data 
(for example, Alvaredo and Atkinson 2010 on South Africa). 
We collect data on the universe of Chinese individuals listed in the report between 2015 
and 2017. We restrict our sample to the wealth holdings of single individuals and exclude joint 
wealth holdings listed in the report, as it is difficult to estimate each individual’s share of wealth 
correctly. Furthermore, of the three years we consider in this paper, only the 2016 report contains 
each individual’s province of birth. As the province of birth is our primary variable used to estimate 
the variation in the exposure to famine, we construct the panel of individuals (2015–2017) using 
the 2016 report. 
The measure of province-level famine intensity we use for our main analysis is from the 
1990 China Population Census. The census reports 1% of the universe of China’s population. To 
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construct the province-level famine intensity, we first calculate the average cohort size for the 
three years prior to (i.e., 1956–58) and after (i.e., 1962–64) the famine for each province. We then 
calculate the average cohort size during the famine (i.e., 1959–61) for each province. We measure 
the famine intensity as the percentage decrease from the average pre- and post-famine cohort size 
to the cohort size during the famine.3 This measure then captures the percentage of missing people 
in the famine cohort in each province. 
As the Chinese government restricted internal migration with its family registration system 
(Hukou), regional variation in the missing birth cohort may be a potentially ideal proxy for famine 
intensity. Our construction of the famine intensity variable is consistent with earlier studies that 
examine the impact of famine in China (Yao, 1999; Meng and Qian, 2009). However, as a 
robustness check, in Section VI we conduct a separate analysis considering the excess death rate 
in each province during this period, as reported in Lin and Yang (2000), and obtain consistent 
results. 
Figure 1 reports the famine intensity of each province in China based on our calculations. 
As shown, there is sizable variation by province in famine intensity. For example, Anhui and 
Sichuan are among the most affected provinces, whereas Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and 
Beijing are among the least affected. Figure 2 reports the log mean wealth (in US dollars) of 
individuals for each year of birth and by famine intensity. The red and blue lines represent the 
mean wealth of individuals born in provinces where the famine intensity was above and below the 
average, respectively. Figure 2 somehow depicts a parallel trend in the wealth holding of Chinese 
individuals based on famine intensity, except for the extremes. 
 
3 At the time, Chongqing was part of Sichuan province. Therefore, we consider that the famine intensity of Chongqing equals that 
of Sichuan province. 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the outcomes and the main individual-level 
control variables based on total as well as province-level famine intensity. The primary outcome 
we focus on is the log of total wealth. Table 1 shows that individuals born in provinces where 
famine intensity was higher than average possess average higher wealth. Furthermore, individuals 
born in provinces with higher famine intensity are more likely to be born before the famine. These 
differences underline the fallacy of relying solely on cross-provincial variation in famine intensity 
to identify the long-run effect. As we explain later, our proposed difference-in-differences (DD) 
approach uses within-province, cross-cohort variation to identify correctly the effect of famine and 
controls for the differences between birth cohorts that are common across Chinese provinces. The 
observed differences in the density of wealth holdings across provinces and the birth of individuals 
in our sample further suggest some differences in the ex-ante and ex-post cohort-specific trends in 
wealth holdings that are unrelated to the dismissals. In Section VI, we examine whether there are 
any pre- and post-famine cohort-specific different trends by performing a falsification test and find 
no evidence of such trends. 
IV. Identification 
In this section, we describe our strategy for identifying the effect of the Great Chinese Famine on 
wealth inequality. Our identification strategy exploits province-by-cohort level variation in famine 
intensity to provide a causal effect. This is a generalized DD strategy where the principal treatment 
variables are the interactions between the percentages of the excess mortality rate during the 
famine period (famine intensity) with a dummy variable identifying those born before and during 
the famine.4 In particular, the proposed estimates of the average treatment effect are given by 𝜆1   
 
4 We divide the timing of an individual’s exposure into two groups after considering earlier studies on the medical effects of famine. 
See Almond and Currie (2011) for a review. 
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and 𝜆2 in the following baseline province of birth, birth year, and year of individual ranking year 
fixed effects equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑦𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆1(𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑦 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝)
+ 𝜆2(𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑦 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝) + 𝜇𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛿𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑝
+ 𝜂𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑦𝑝𝑡         (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑦𝑡 is the outcome of interest for individual i born in province p and year y for ranking 
year t. 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝 is the province-level average decrease in cohort size during the famine 
period in comparison with the general trend (pre and post). 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑦 is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if individual i was born during the famine (1959–61) and zero otherwise. 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑦 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if individual i was born before the 
famine (1958 or before) and zero otherwise. 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑝 are the province of birth fixed effects 
controlling for the fact that provinces may be systematically different from each other. 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 
are the birth year fixed effects, controlling for nationwide common shocks. 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 are the 
individuals’ ranking year (in the Hurun Report) fixed effects, controlling for the common change 
in wealth over time. 𝑖𝑝𝑦𝑡  is a random, idiosyncratic error term. We should be aware that we use 
a panel of individual data covering 2015–2017. We therefore estimate a random effects model as 
the individual effects are not correlated with the treatment. 
We conjecture that the famine affects those individuals born in 1961 and before. We 
construct two treatment groups of individuals based on the findings from the literature. For 
instance, the medical and health literature finds that exposure to famine could have different effects 
on individuals already born before the famine began, and on those born during the famine period 
(especially in utero exposure) (Almond and Currie, 2011). Because individuals born after 1961 are 
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unaffected by the famine, these form our control group. 
V. Estimation Results 
Table 2 reports the main results. The dependent variable is the natural log of the total amount of 
wealth held by an individual in US dollars. Each column is a separate regression with various 
specifications. Columns 1–3 report the main results of estimating equation (1) with various 
specifications. Our first DD estimate of 𝜆1 is reported in the first row, with the estimates showing 
that 𝜆1 is negative at the 1% level of significance in every specification. After controlling for the 
various fixed effects in column 3, the results suggest that a one percentage point increase in famine 
intensity leads to a 1.4 percent decrease in wealth on average. In terms of magnitude, the difference 
in wealth based on exposure to famine is quite large. In our calculation, the province-level famine 
intensity was 37.28 percent on average during this period. This implies that at its mean, the famine 
caused a decrease in wealth of about 52 percent. 
Our second DD estimate for 𝜆2 is reported in the third row of Table 2. As shown, the 
coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant from zero in every specification. The results 
show no statistically significant effect of individuals born before the famine and exposed to 
different famine intensity on wealth holdings. In summary, our overall findings suggest that in 
utero exposure (born during the famine) to famine has a significant negative effect on wealth, but 
that otherwise the general effect of exposure to the famine is minimal. We also find that the effect 
of famine persists in China for at least more than five decades. 
As discussed before, we considered the individuals listed in the 2016 Hurun Report and 
constructed panel data over 2015–2017 as the province of birth is only available in the 2016 report. 
There may be some concern that our estimations may be misleading as the main results reported 
in columns 1–3 in Table 2 do not account for those individuals listed in the 2015 and 2017 reports 
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but not included in the 2016 report. If they are somehow correlated with famine, or 
disproportionately related at the province level, these excluded individuals in our estimation could 
produce a biased result. To check the robustness of our findings, we estimate equation (1) 
considering the wealth of those individuals listed in the 2016 report only. We report the results in 
columns 4 and 5 with various alternative specifications. As we can see, the results are statistically 
and quantitatively similar to the baseline specification reported in columns 1–3. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, there is a wide variation in individual wealth at the two extremes. 
One of the reasons is that the sample size in each year (the number of individuals born each year 
and listed in the report) can be small. Another concern could be that the older and younger cohorts 
may differ from the middle-aged category on various dimensions, which we may not capture in 
our estimation. If the unobserved difference somehow systematically correlates in our estimation, 
it may bias the results. Furthermore, in our baseline estimation, we consider the full sample of 
individuals to examine the effect of the general exposure to famine (born before the famine 
variable) on any differences in reported wealth. There might be some concern that the effect of 
exposure to famine may differ by age. In particular, medical research and recent research in 
economics find that infants (below five years old) are most vulnerable to such events (Currie and 
Almond, 2011). 
To further test the robustness of our findings, we estimate equation (1) with alternative 
specifications in Table 3. For comparison, we present the baseline estimation in column 1 that is 
similar to column 3 in Table 2. In column 2, we estimate the coefficients by restricting our sample 
to individuals born 15 years before and after the famine (i.e., between 1944 and 1976). Furthermore, 
in column 3, we restrict our sample to individuals born 10 years before and after the famine (i.e., 
between 1949 and 1971) and perform our regression analysis. Finally, in column 4, we restrict our 
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sample to individuals born five years before and after the famine (i.e., between 1954 and 1966) 
and perform our analysis. The results shown in columns 2–4 are quite consistent and quantitatively 
similar to our main results reported in column 1. 
In summary, we find that the wide variation in individual wealth, especially at the two 
extremes (the very old and very young cohorts) (Figure 2), is not driving our main findings. 
Furthermore, we find that childhood exposure to famine (the first 5, 10, and 15 years of life) has 
no statistically significant effect on wealth holdings, which is consistent with our main findings. 
Moreover, in line with the ‘fetal origins hypothesis’ (Barker, 1990; Almond and Currie, 2011), we 
reveal a significant negative effect of individuals born during the famine on wealth holdings in 
China.  
Up to this point, we have examined the combined effect of exposure to famine on wealth 
inequality in China. In Figure 3, we present the year-on-year effect of the exposure to famine. Each 
point in Figure 3 is the estimated coefficient from a separate regression where the treatment groups 
are the individuals born in that specific year. Thus, each point estimates the effect of being born in 
that year and the variation in exposure to famine on the differences in wealth (with a 95% 
confidence interval). For clear visualization, we only plot the effect immediately before and after 
five years, along with the famine years. As shown, the individuals born in each famine year are 
negative and significantly different from zero. Unfortunately, we do not have any information 
regarding an individual’s actual date and month of birth, which would have allowed us to examine 
the mechanism in more detail. We refer this question to future research. 
VI. Placebo Test and Other Robustness Checks 
Our main estimation results rely on the assumption of a parallel trend, which assumes that the 
affected and the control cohorts would exhibit parallel trends in the absence of famine. In other 
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words, the estimated coefficient for the interaction between the dummy for being born during the 
famine (1959–61) and the famine intensity in each province would be zero in the absence of famine. 
We first visualize the validity of the parallel trend assumption. Figure 2 shows that those provinces 
with varying intensities of famine generally exhibit parallel trends. In this section, we provide 
further evidence on the parallel trend assumptions by performing additional falsification tests. 
In our falsification test, we focus on the older cohort already born before the start of the 
famine (the before cohort) and the younger cohort born after the famine (the after cohort). In our 
specification, we treat individuals born three years immediately before (1956–58) and after the 
famine (1962–64) as the placebo-affected cohort for the before and after cohorts, respectively, and 
we perform a falsification test for each group. Furthermore, as we revealed some heterogeneity in 
the very oldest and very youngest cohorts, we restrict our cohorts to those born immediately before 
or after the famine (within six years before and after) and check the robustness of our findings. We 
present the results in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 check the parallel trend 
assumptions of the before and after cohorts with various specifications, respectively. From Table 
5, we find that the differences in wealth holdings between the before and after cohorts are similar 
and not significantly different from zero. In other words, the falsification test suggests that the 
wealth holdings of individuals born before and after the famine are unaffected by the province-
level famine intensity. 
Another potential confounding factor in our main findings could be the measurement of 
famine intensity. We noted in Section III that we construct the famine intensity measure using the 
missing birth cohorts from the 1990 census. However, studies on the Great Chinese Famine 
highlight a sharp decline in the birth rate during the famine period. One could argue that fertility 
decisions are endogenous, especially during a severe catastrophic situation, such as the Great 
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Chinese Famine. Furthermore, the missing birth cohort fails to capture the mortality rates of adults 
and the elderly. Additionally, there is evidence of a sudden increase in the birth rate immediately 
after the famine, which could inflate the missing birth cohort during the famine period. Therefore, 
our measure of famine intensity may be severely biased. We provide an additional check for our 
main findings by estimating equation (1) using the excess death rate as a direct measure of famine 
intensity.5 
We present the results in Table 5 with various specifications, and they are similar and 
statistically consistent with the main results in Table 2. According to the regression estimates in 
column 3 of Table 5, a one percentage point increase in famine intensity (based on excess death 
rates) leads to on average about 2 percent decrease in wealth. Comparing this with our earlier 
estimate, the famine caused a decrease of 29.6 percent of wealth on average (the average excess 
death rate in the sample is 14.8 percent). 
VII: Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we combine contemporary individual-level wealth data with historical data on famine 
severity in China and found that exposure to famine has a negative effect on the wealth of 
individuals born during this period. Our results showed that the famine caused an average decline 
in wealth of 29.6–52.0 percent. Furthermore, we check for a variety of identifying assumptions 
and placebo tests and provide some evidences that the relationship is causal. 
As we have discussed before, it is important to emphasize that we should be cautious when 
 
5 The province-level death rates are from Lin and Yang (2000). To construct the province-level excess death rate, we first calculate 
the average death rate for the three years prior to (1956–58) and after (1962–64) the famine for each province. We then calculate 
the average death rate during the famine (1959–61) for each province and measure the excess death rate as the percentage decrease 
from the average pre- and post-famine death rate to the death rate during the famine. Note that Chongqing and Hainan were part of 
Sichuan province and Guangdong province during the famine period, respectively. Therefore, we consider the famine intensity of 
Chongqing and Hainan equal to Sichuan province and Guangdong province, respectively. 
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generalizing the findings from this study. In this paper, we rely on wealthy individuals to provide 
a (plausible) causal effect of exposure to famine on wealth inequality in present-day China. Our 
estimation can thus provide some insights in to the degree of inequality at the top. Therefore, it 
would be challenging to obtain insight into the overall effect of exposure to famine on wealth 
inequality in China. We thus argue that the findings provide a lower bound estimate for the 
potential long-term consequences of the Great Chinese Famine on wealth inequality. In future, it 
would be interesting to study the overall effect of the Great famine on wealth inequality in China 
by exploiting some novel dataset. 
The Great Chinese Famine appears to be an extreme example to provide insight into the 
effect of exposure to famine on wealth inequality. However, famines are not unique to China. 
Famine has affected hundreds of millions of people alive today in developing as well as developed 
countries at some point in time during their lifetime (Meng and Qian, 2009). Conflict and fragility 
are also persistent and still seen in many developing and middle-income countries. For example, 
drought currently affects more than 22 million people in East Africa, and at least 15 million people 
are going hungry.6 Similarly, 6.8 million people currently experience extreme hunger in Yemen, 
13.5 million people are in need of assistance in Syria, and 5 million refugees have fled to other 
countries.78 Thus, viewed more broadly, this study could provide some insight into understanding 
the present inequality between countries that have faced such events in the past, and the future 
inequality for those countries that are currently facing these events. Although it is only anecdotal 
evidence, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have the most unequal wealth distributions (based on wealth 
 
6 https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/east-africa-food-crisis. Accessed October 2, 2018. 
7 https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/yemen-crisis. Accessed October 2, 2018. 
8 https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/syria-crisis. Accessed October 2, 2018. 
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Gini index) in the world today, and are countries that have also faced serious famines in the past.9 
Further research on these issues is necessary to provide rigorous analysis at the micro as well as 
the macro level.  
 
9 According to the Credit Suisse Global Databook 2018, Ukraine and Kazakhstan rank first and second based on the wealth Gini 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wealth (Log) 20.578 20.512 20.537 0.066** 
 (0.853) (0.783) (0.811) (0.031) 
Born before the famine (before 1959) 0.378 0.337 0.352 0.041** 
 (0.485) (0.473) (0.478) (0.018) 
Born during the famine (1959–61) 0.075 0.084 0.080 –0.009 
 (0.263) (0.277) (0.272) (0.010) 
Born after the famine (after 1962) 0.548 0.579 0.567 –0.031* 
 (0.498) (0.494) (0.496) (0.019) 
Famine Intensity 47.395 31.133 37.278 16.262*** 
 (8.337) (6.033) (10.540) (0.266) 
Birth Year   1960.821 1961.360 1961.156 –0.539* 
 (8.133) (8.389) (8.296) (0.315) 
Sample Year    2016 0.362 0.352 0.356 0.010 
 (0.481) (0.478) (0.479) (0.018) 
                         2017 0.310 0.324 0.319 –0.014 
 (0.463) (0.468) (0.466) (0.018) 
No. of Observations 1114 1834 2948  
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses for columns 1–3. Standard errors in parentheses for column 4. 
 
 
 
 27 
 
  
 28 
 
  
 29 
 
  
 30 
 
